

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 LOME 01769 012035Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
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O P 011655Z JUN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY LOME  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4229  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BANGUI PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY KINSAHSA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L L O M E 1769

EXDIS

ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DATT; MONROVIA FOR AMBASSADOR PALMER

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PINS MOPS EFIN EAID CG TO  
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBILITY OF TOGOLESE PARTICIPATION  
IN PROPOSED SHABA PEACEKEEPING FORCE

REF: STATE 137343

1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: PRESIDENT EYADEMA WOULD  
FIND IT DIFFICULT TO REFUSE A REQUEST FROM MOBUTU TO  
PARTICIPATE IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN SHABA. SEVERAL  
CONSIDERATIONS, HOWEVER, SHOULD LEAD EYADEMA TO HOLD THE  
TOGOLESE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO SYMBOLIC PROPORTIONS, EG,  
IN THE ORDER OF A COMPANY OF PARATROOPS. THE ABSENCE OF A  
PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION FOR TOGO MIGHT COMPLICATE US LOGISTIC  
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SUPPORT FOR AN INTRA-AFRICAN FORCE WHICH INCLUDED A  
TOGOLESE CONTRIBUTION. TOGOLESE PARTICIPATION WOULD PROBABLY  
LEAD TO A NEW REQUEST FOR US MILITARY ASSISTANCE. END SUMMARY.

2. SEVERAL FACTORS MAKE TOGOLESE PARTICIPATION LIKELY.  
EYADEMA IS ALREADY PUBLICLY COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF  
MUTUAL SECURITY IN THE SHABA INCIDENT: QUOTE WHEN YOUR

NEIGHBOR'S HOUSE IS ON FIRE, YOU MUST AID HIM OR RISK THE SAME FATE. SHABA IS NOT ONLY ZAIRE'S BUSINESS, BUT ALL AFRICA'S. UNQUOTE.

3. TOGO HAS NO OBJECTION IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATING IN JOINT MILITARY GROUPINGS AS SHOWN BY ITS ADHERENCE TO THE CEAO DEFENSE FORCE, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE CEAO ITSELF. MOREOVER, EYADEMA HAS UNUSUALLY GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH MOBUTU. FINALLY, THE TOGOLESE ARE SINCERLY AND DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SPREAD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFRICA. FOR THIS REASON, TOGO WISHES THE US TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN COUNTER-BALANCING THE USSR AND WOULD BE LIKELY TO SUPPORT AN INITIATIVE THAT HAD THE EFFECT OF INCREASING US INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, TOGO'S EXPERIENCE IN MILITARY COOPERATION WITH ZAIRE HAS NOT BEEN GOOD. THE TOGOLESE ARMED FMRCS (FAT) HAVE NOT BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE RESULTS OF ZAIRIAN TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR TOGOLESE PILOTS AND PARATROOPERS. THE FLIGHT DISCIPLINE OF A ZAIRIAN JET SQUADRON WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE CEREMONY ON THE OCCASION OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF EYADEMA'S RULE IN 1977 WAS SO ATROCIOUS THAT THE AERIAL PART OF THE PROGRAM HAD TO BE CANCELLED IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY. JUST RECENTLY, IN REPLY TO A FRENCH OFFICIAL WHO SUGGESTED THE PRESS VERSIONS OF FAZ ATROCITIES IN KOLWEZI WERE PROBABLY EXAGGERATED, CONFIDENTIAL

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EYADEMA IS ALLEGED TO HAVE SAID THAT TO THE CONTRARY, FROM HIS EXPERIENCE WITH FAZ INDISCIPLINE, HE CONSIDERED THE REPORTS PROBABLY UNDERSTATED THE FACTS. SUCH ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCE WILL LEAD TOGO TO WANT TO LIMIT ITS POSSIBLE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO A SYMBOLIC MINIMUM.

5. TOGO CONSIDERS BOTH ITS LATERAL NEIGHBORS TO BE POTENTIAL THREATS. TOGO IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE BUILD-UP OF COMMUNIST ARMS IN BENIN. BENIN IS PERCEIVED AS BEING INTERESTED IN DESTABILIZING TOGO AS A RESULT OF IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND SOVIET PRODDING. TOGO ALSO FEARS THAT GHANA'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS MAY LEAD IT TO CONSIDER A DISTRACTING EXTERNAL ADVENTURE USING THE TOGOLAND ISSUE AS A PRETEXT. THE INSECURITIES RAISED BY THE PERCEPTIONS WILL LEAD TOGO TO RESIST WEAKENING ITS OWN DEFENSES BY MORE THAN A TOKEN CONTRIBUTION.

6. TOGO CONDUCTS A FORMALLY NON-ALIGNED AND ECLECTIC FOREIGN POLICY AND SEEKS GOOD RELATIONS WITH RADICAL AFRICAN STATES SUCH A LIBYA, ALGERIA AND GUINE, AS WELL AS WITH MORE MODERATE AFRICAN COUNTRIES. IT MIGHT CONSIDER AN OVERLY ENTHUSIASTIC PARTICIPATION IN A SHABA FORCE AS A

THREAT TO THESE RELATIONS. TOGO MAY REASON THAT THE MORE IMPORTANT ITS CONTRIBUTION TO A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IS, THE MORE LIKELY IT IS TO PROVOKE A SOVIET-INSPIRED DESTABILIZATION ATTEMPT AGAINST ITSELF. THIS FEAR IS AUGMENTED BY LACK OF HARD INFORMATION ON WHO SPONSORED LAST YEAR'S MERCENARY OPERATION AIMED AT ASSASSINATING EYADEMA. THESE CONCERNS WILL ALSO TEND TO LIMIT TOGO'S CONTRIBUTION TO SYMBOLIC PROPORTIONS.

7. ASSUMING THAT TOGO IS PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE A PARATROOP COMPANY (NOT MORE THAN 150 MEN), IT SHOULD BE REALIZED THAT

SUCH A FORCE WOULD BE CAPABLE OF ONLY A MINIMAL MILITARY ROLE. ALTHOUGH IN EXCELLENT PHYSICAL CONDITION AND WELL DISCIPLINED  
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BY AFRICAN STANDARDS, THE TOGOLESE ARMED FORCES RECEIVE MINIMUM OPERATIONAL TRAINING. EVEN THE PARATROOPS ARE ESSENTIALLY GARRISON TROOPS. TOGO HAS THE AIRLIFT TO GET A COMPANY TO ZAIRE WITH PERSONAL WEAPONS. IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY LOGISTICAL STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT EVEN A MINIMUM EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND WOULD BE TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON OUTSIDE SUPPORT.

8. TOGO HAS NEVER HAD A PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION TO PERMIT US MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THIS MIGHT PLACE LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON US ASSISTANCE TO AN INTER-AFRICAN FORCE INCLUDING TOGO SHOULD BE EXAMINED.

9. SHOULD TOGO CONTRIBUTE TO A PEACEKEEPING FORCE, IT CAN BE EXPECTED TO SEEK ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO OFFSET WHAT IT WOULD SEE AS ITS INCREASED EXPOSURE TO RADICAL OR SOVIET DESTABILIZATION ATTEMPTS. FRANCE WOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL ADDRESSEE OF SUCH REQUESTS, BUT THE US SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED FOR A RENEWED REQUEST FOR BILATERAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

10. INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH FRENCH EMBASSY COLLEAGUES INDICATE THAT THEIR ASSESSMENT IS SIMILAR TO THE ABOVE. THE MISSION IS NOT AWARE OF ANY INTRA-GOVERNMENTAL DISCUSSION IN THE GOT OF POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN A SHABA FORCE, AND WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF MILITARY PREPARATIONS. YOUNG

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